Abstract: The conferences of Rio de Janeiro 1992 and Kyoto 1997 demand for new economic instruments which h a ve a focus on environmental protection in the macro and micro economy. An important economic tool being part of the treaty o f K y oto in that area is Joint-Implementation. I t i s a n i n ternational program which i n tends to strenghten international cooperations between enterprises in order to reduce CO 2 -emissions.
Introduction
The realization of Joint-Implementation JI is determined by technical and nancial constraints. In a JI Program, the reduced emissions resulting from technical cooperations are recorded at the Clearing House. The TEM model integrates both the simulation of the technical and nancial parameters. In Pickl 1999 the TEM model is treated as a time-discrete control problem. Furthermore, the analysis of the feasible set is examined in Pickl 2000. In the following, a short introduction into the TEM model is given. Furthermore, we w ant to present a new bargaining approach which leads towards a procedure for an international emissions trading procedure within the so-called Kyoto game.
The Technology-Emissions-Means TEM model
The presented TEM model describes the economic interaction between several actors players which intend to maximize their reduction of emissions E i caused by technologies T i , by expenditures of money M i o r b y nancial means. The index stands for the i-th player, i 2 f 1; : : : ; n g. The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market. The e ectivity measure parameter em ij describes the e ect on the emissions of the i-th player if the j-th actor invests money for his technologies. We can say that it expresses how e ective technology cooperations are like an innovation factor, which is the central element of a JI Program. The variable ' can be regarded as a memory parameter of the nancial investigations, whereas the value i acts as a growth parameter. For a deeper insight see Pickl 1999 . The TEM model is represented by the following two equations:
It is a great advantage of the TEM model, that we are able to determine the em ij -parameter empirically. In the rst equation, the level of the reduced emissions at the t + 1-th time-step depends on the last value plus a market e ect. This e ect is represented by the additive terms which might b e negative or positive.
In general, E i 0 implies that the actors have y et reached the demanded value E i = 0 normalized Kyoto-level. A value E i 0 expresses that the emissions are less than the requirements of the treaty. In the second equation we see that for such a situation the nancial means will increase, whereas E i 0 leads to a reduction of M i t + 1:
The second equation contains the logistic functional dependence and the memory parameter ' i which describes the e ect of the preceeding investment of nancial means. The dynamics does not guarantee, that the parameter M i t lies in the interval, which can be regarded as a budget for the i-th actor. For that reason we h a ve to add the following restrictions to the dynamical representation: 0 M i t M i ; i = 1 ; : : : ; n and t = 0 ; : : : ; N : These restrictions ensure that the nancial investigations can neither be negative nor exceed the budget of each actor. Now, it is easy to show that , i M i t M i , M i t 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n and t = 0 ; : : : ; N : We h a ve guaranteed that M i t + 1 increases if E i t + ' i E i t 0 and it decreases if E i t + ' i E i t 0. Applying the memory parameter ' i , w e h a ve developed a reasonable model for the money expenditure -emission -i n teraction, where the in uence of the technologies is integrated in the em-matrix of the system. We can use the TEM model as a time-discrete model where we start with a special parameter set and observe the resulting trajectories. Normally, the actors start with a negative v alue, i.e., they lie under the baseline mentioned in Kyoto Protocol, see Kyoto 1997. They try to reach a positive value of E i . By adding control parameters, we enforce this development b y an additive nancial term. For that reason the control parameters are added only to the second equation of our model:
The introduction of the control parameter u i t implies that each actor makes an additional investigation at each time-step. In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state, mentioned in the treaty o f Kyoto, b y c hoosing the control parameters such that the emissions of each player become minimized. The focus is the realization of the necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost game, which is determined by the way of actors cooperation. considering that E i t = E i t + 1 , E i t
In order to reach steady states, which are determined in Pickl 1999, an independent institution may in uence the trade relations between the actors. The trade relations are expressed by the emmatrix. In practice, the imposing of taxes or the giving of incentives means that in the TEM-model the em-parameter will change. Now, the principle of JI implies that technical cooperation will be bene tted. If there is a cooperation between player 1 and player 2, we i n troduce an additional parameter ; 0, which implies that the measure of e ectivity increases. In the sequel, we h a ve B I n d K := A; with a ij = b ij , i fi 2 K and j 2 K a ij = 0 , otherwise For the time-dependent grand coalition we get:
ForM i t' i M i t 0 i; j 2 f 1; : : : ; n g the di erence between the cooperative and the non-cooperative case is always positive. So we h a ve constructed a reasonable cost-game. Now, the method is that at each time step, this amount is put into a central fund, which can also be used as a feasible set for our control process. In the following we analyse a special allocation principle.
In order to get an intuition of the problem, let us begin with a very simple case where we h a ve only two players. The fund exists and the two players have t wo alternatives to invest. The coordinate axis is the starting point of the two players. Each actor tries to reach the black square which stands for the level of reductions of emissions mentioned in Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto 1997. For that reason we h a ve a limited time-horizon. After the rst time-step one of the squares with a grey square will be attained. The players make their choice independently and simultaneously. The directions are attached by the small diagram. The rst player goes to the right. If he reduces one unit of CO 2 -emissions, then he has to invest 3 nancial units. If he will attain a reduction of two units he has to invest 5 nancial units. One of the main problems in the area of JI and JET is the question of an optimal schedule of technical innovations. Therefore, in Krabs, Pickl 2000 the control problem is solved from a pure mathematical point of view. Here, we model such a situation with a time-discrete approach where we h a ve three investment units. Each actor can choose between two alternatives 2-step-1-step or 1-step-2-step. The strategy 2-step-1-step stands for a great reduction at the beginning and a smaller investment at the end of the period. The costs are lower than a 1-step-2-step strategy because we w ant t o s i m ulate innovations. We can transfer this simple model with two players and two time-steps to an easy matrix game, which w e call the Kyoto-Game. The pairs 7; 7 and 8; 8 are Nash-equilibria. A derivation from that chosen strategy is not favourized by one player acting alone. Nevertheless the tuple 1; 2; 1; 2 is favourized by e v ery actor yielding a minimum of nancial costs.
5 The Co-funding Process and Joint I n ternational Emissions Trading -JET If we w ant to support a special path or technology, then we can introduce an additive tax to a special energy path. It is possible to regard as a Pigou tax. It is easy to see that for 1 only one Nash-Equilibrium exists. The value = 1 can be seen as maximal trading interval, or as a necessary technical e ectivity measure to guarantee uniqueness. Furthermore, as the necessary data is given to the Clearing House, w e are able to compare the obtained results with real world phenomena. An extension to an n-player situation with various time-steps may lead to new insights in that economic eld and support an improvement of such important energy management tools.
